Virtual monies present a limit case in debates about money's moral and political entanglements between sociologists, anthropologists and economists. Digitised virtual monies seem ephemeral, almost ideal typical examples of money as a pure medium of exchange. This paper begins with premise that virtual monies are as value-laden and morally entangled as any other form of money. This assertion is demonstrated by exploring how one virtual money, the Linden dollar (L$), and some of its associated practices, are bound up with research participants' moral categories and judgments in the virtual world of Second Life (SL).
offering is. And when we thought about how to put together the offering for the Linden dollar, it was more in the sense of a product team. We did retain economic consultants.
But that was just one input. It was more trying to understand a particular product offering and not trying to understand the world of macroeconomics. (Metanomics, 2007:4) When Yoon described Second Life's virtual money, the Linden dollar (L$), as a product, many audience members typed angry replies in the Metanomics group chat channel. Such attendees thought Yoon's comment reduced Second Life to a mere service and Linden dollars to casino chips. Yoon and Bloomfield struggled to continue their discussion in real-time voice chat over the rapidly scrolling lines of heated text-based debate. Audience members were still arguing about Linden dollars the following week, so Bloomfield asked his guests to comment on Yoon's remarks. For attendees, the discussion's terms had shifted; they were not only talking about what Linden dollars are, but how these monies should be For Keel, the moral status of virtual money practices and users merge. The words 'some of them' refer to people and money practices. For Keel, and other respondents, money practices are implicated in producing and justifying moral orders in Second Life.
Economic sociologists and anthropologists have argued that money is not morally or politically neutral (Dodd 1994; Hart 2000; Zelizer 1997 Zelizer , 2005 Ingham 1996; Thrift and Leyshon 1997) . Though sociological and anthropological critiques have defended the position that everyday monies are not mere instruments whose only effect is making exchange and production more efficient, virtual monies seem somehow less consequential, more easily reduced to numbers or signs (see Thrift and Leyshon 1997 for a critique). Virtual monies are dematerialised, untainted by 'the social'. Yet virtual monies are still embedded in societies (Granovetter 1985) . As Thrift and Leyshon (1997:20) practices, are entangled with moralities and assessments of others' respectability, social position, appropriate rights and dignity (Lamont 1992; Sayer 2005a Sayer , 2005b .
Virtual monies like the Linden dollar are not only implicated in moral judgments, they may also be moral entities. This paper extends existing debates on money's social entanglements into a new domain, virtual worlds, using concepts from the sociology of morality. My secondary aim is a proof by example that economic sociology and the sociology of morality are an analytically useful combination deserving further exploration. Recently there has been renewed sociological interest in morality (Abend 2008; Hitlin and Vaisley 2010; Sayer 2005a Sayer , 2005b , but beyond Zelizer's (1997 Zelizer's ( , 2005 work on families and intimacies, economic sociology has maintained an arm's length relationship with questions of economy and moral order (Massengill and Reynolds 2010:486) . Through an analysis of moral boundary drawing using virtual money practices in Second Life, this paper contributes to efforts in economic sociology and anthropology to elucidate -through empirically grounded examples -money's moral and political entanglements.
Without entering into debates about differing historical approaches to morality in sociology (see Abend 2008; Powell 2010 ) I follow Abend's (2008:87) conception:
The sociology of morality is the sociological investigation of the nature, causes, and consequences of people's ideas about the good and the right. . . In this ethnographic research, respondents' descriptions of virtual money practices can be divided into two broad types, according to whether interviewees emphasise either moral categorisation of practices, which are then projected onto people, or what people deserve based on how they use Linden dollars. In both instances, respondents draw moral boundaries between people with varyings degrees of respectability. These two kinds of accounts correspond to Abend's nature and consequences. Thus, my data and analysis primarily concern ideas and evaluations of practices rather than acts premised on moral beliefs. The first type shows what beliefs exist about Linden dollars and how these ideas are used to generate and reproduce moral categories of people and practices. These are 'modes of reasoning and talking that define things as legitimate' (Wuthnow 1996:52) . The second type are ideas about consequences that should follow for people engaging in certain practices. Fourcade and Healy (2007:286) argue that theories and 'public justifications of contemporary economic order' -specifically markets -are 'intensely moralized and moralizing'. But not only markets are moralising. Dodd (1994:154) argues one of the key dimensions to a conceptualisation of money is its association with 'unfettered empowerment, of complete freedom'. Yet monies and moralities remain under-explored in sociology, except by proxy in studies of class (Lamont 1992; Sayer 2005a Sayer , 2005b . As Hart (1986:638-639) has argued, 'money is at the same time an aspect of relations between persons and a thing detached from persons'. As things that are part of relations but also separate from them, monies are a means of distinguishing between people, things and relations. Monies are capable of performing the same tasks that moral boundary drawing (Lamont 2005a (Lamont , 2005b ) attempts to achieve. There is no higher virtue or moral duty in contemporary Western consumer capitalist societies than the injunction to be free, to be empowered -though not always through consumption. It is difficult to imagine how any objects associated with such deeply felt, idealistic notions could possibly be morally neutral.
Finally, as 'places of human culture' (Boellstorff 2008:17) , virtual worlds such as Second Life are spaces where moralities are generated, contested and maintained. Work on virtual moralities usually focuses on griefing (eg: Bakioglu 2009 , Luck 2009a ) and cheating (eg: Wright et al 2002; Consalvo 2007) . This paper moves into a new domain for virtual moralities by focusing on virtual economic activities. This paper contributes to a growing interest across interdisciplinary study of digital cultures in exploring moral distinctions that are not necessarily disruptive to user experiences or the flow of play in virtual worlds, such as ethics in romantic relationships (Gabriels 2012; Jones 2010) ; taboo violation (Whitty et al. 2011; Luck 2009b; Young 2013) . With respect to economies and moralities, there is small literature on real money trading in game-oriented virtual worlds (Nakamura 2009; Heeks 2009; Nardi and Kow 2010) .
However, Such research focuses more on racism and economic models than on moralities. analysis of secondary texts. This field work was part of a larger project on economic lay theories, categories and concepts. Participant observation included activities like creating objects with other residents; sociable activities like shopping, parties and treasure hunts; attending SL events (like Metanomics), classes and academic lectures. Details of participant observation were noted in a field diary. With permission, screen shots (images) were also generated and archived. In addition to spontaneous, informal discussions, I conducted thirty one-on-one interviews in various settings: virtual homes and offices, landscaped gardens, shopping malls, underwater grottoes, and around campfires.
Some interviews were multi-sited; respondents traveled through SL's virtual world, introducing me to significant places and people. Interviews were conducted in English or French with respondents from Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Holland, the United States, Canada, Russia, the Czech Republic, and Australia. Key informants quoted in this article are European and American. Interviews were automatically logged in the SL viewer client and then transferred to rich text files. Transcripts and participant observation notes were coded for shared and unique themes. For this paper, codes related to moralities, monies, money practices and social exclusion were used. All names used are pseudonyms, with three exceptions. IntLibber Brautigan is a well-known Second Life businessman who preferred to be identified by his SL screen names to promote his virtual enterprises. Gene Yoon and Robert Bloomfield are public figures whose actual names are linked to their SL screen names. Secondary texts included forum posts, blogs, videos, press releases and materials suggested by respondents.
About Second Life
Second Life (SL) is a free-form, open source, three-dimensional virtual world created by its users, who are known as residents. This virtual world is accessed using software called the SL Viewer. Designed and maintained by Linden Lab, SL is home to a diverse range of communities. Respondents described Second Life as a platform for creativity and sociability rather than a video game. Though each resident decides how she wishes to exist and interact in-world, conflicts can arise between competing visions of the virtual 'good life'. This article covers only one type of moral boundary drawing in SL -those related to money -but other significant distinctions exist. For example, moral boundaries are drawn around embodiment, as exemplified by some residents' unease with or aggression toward the animal bodies of Furry residents (Bakioglu 2009:12-13) . Moral boundaries are also drawn around behaviour toward new residents. Welcoming, helpful and generous attitudes are normative (Martin 2012; Boellstorff 2008:186-187) ; behaving otherwise constitutes a moral failure according to some residents (Gabriels 2012:81) . Second Life's economy is interpenetrated by everyday economies. Linden dollars can be purchased with everyday currencies, as in other sociability-oriented virtual worlds like There and Habbo Hotel.
Transactions between SL residents are paid in Linden dollars, and may occur in SL or through websites selling virtual merchandise. Linden Lab sells Linden dollars through their virtual money exchange (LindeX), and via a menu option in the SL viewer. There are third party Linden dollar exchanges, though not all are licensed by Linden Lab. Some residents are excluded from virtual money purchases because Paypal or credit cards recognised by Linden Lab and third party Linden dollar sellers are not available in their country. An economically significant fault-line divides residents with a large stake in the promotion of Second Life's economy -land barons and business owners -from those whose consumption largely consists of freely copied and circulated goods (Boellstorff 2008:228) .
Theoretical Framework
In Second Life, as in everyday communities, boundary drawing (Lamont 1992; Sayer 2005a Sayer , 2005b Southerton 2002) (Dodd 1994; Hart 1986 Hart , 2000 , or distinguishing between intimate social relations (Zelizer 1996 (Zelizer , 1997 (Zelizer , 2005 , but this analysis explores how monies and virtual money practices are used to constitute and categorise moral subjects. Moral assessments also define the limits of communities, justifying opinions about who is deserving of what virtual rights and privileges. As Gumbard (2004:169) argues, 'symbolic and structural properties of money reveal complex cultural logics'. Moral boundary drawing through money practices reveals regimes of worth (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) and hierarchies of value and disgust. Weber ([1930] 2001), Simmel ([1907 Simmel ([ ]1978 and Marx ([1867] 1906) linked monies with moralities in their accounts of 19th century capitalism (Powell 2010 and Abend 2008) , and this tradition continues in Zelizer's (1996 Zelizer's ( , 1997 Zelizer's ( , 2005 ) work on earmarking and Dodd's (1994) and Hart's (1986 Hart's ( , 2000 emphasis on money and social inequalities. Yet what has been missing in economic sociology are concepts that explain how monies -or other economic categories -produce and maintain moral orders. Zelizer (1996:484) argues that earmarking creates 'a multiplicity of socially meaningful currencies' that are used to sort and categorise relations. However, her accounts of poor relief by American charitable organisations (Zelizer 1996:485; 1997:145-160 ) suggest monies and money practices sort people as well as relations.
. . . the managerial incompetence of the poor provided a perfect loophole to justify the active intervention of social workers in the domestic economy of their clients. For despite new environmental theories of poverty, it was still simpler to redo private economies than tamper with the public market. (Zelizer 1997:152) Perceived improvident money use -'irresponsible' money practices -justified paternalistic interference in the lives of impoverished people, particularly immigrants (Levenstein 2003) . A category of people was identified through their 'bad' money practices. This new group was then precluded from exercising economic agency, ostensibly for their own good. Moral judgments of how money is used thus justify an abject place for a category of persons constructed through and identified by money practices. This example of boundary drawing between the fiscally responsible and feckless is echoed in respondents' . . . social groups often distinguish themselves from others in terms of moral differences, claiming for themselves certain virtues which others are held to lack: we are down-toearth, they are pretentious; we are cosmopolitan, they are parochial; we are hardworking, they are lazy, and so on . . . while the possession of the claimed virtues is held to be localized, the valued norms themselves are assumed to be universally applicable. (Sayer 2005a:953) For Sayer (2005a Sayer ( , 2005b , these boundaries are part of the reproduction of social class in England. For respondents, class is less relevant than distinctions between land owners and 'homeless' users, as Boellstorff (2008:99) services, debt accumulated through property ownership -to further marginalised unemployed or disabled people, students and workers in precarious employment. How money is used becomes a kind of citizenship test whose results must be re-affirmed repeatedly by remaining solvent, being credit worthy (Polillo 2011) , and spending money appropriately (Gumbard 2004) . These shared understandings build a polity that 'sustains various constructions of political philosophy and gives direction to the ordinary sense of what is just' (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006:74) . Such agreements about what is worthy and proper, which are admittedly rather fragmented in virtual worlds (Ross forthcoming), establish the principles of a shared humanity. With respect to money, such understandings 'reflect in microcosm the larger social world' (Gumbard 2004:169) , as money is both embedded in and separate from social relations.
The consequences of classifying people according to the moral status of their money practicesaccording rights to some and taking them away from others -strike at the essential nature of money.
Money. . . is not defined by its properties as a material object but by symbolic qualities generically linked to the ideal of unfettered empowerment. . . complete freedom to act and assimilate at will, is none the less at the heart of the conceptualization of money in general as a transparent symbolic medium. This is the basis of the desire to possess money, of the very concept of money. . . (Dodd 1994:154) In consumer capitalist societies especially, money is deeply linked to emancipation and 'empowerment'.
Monetary accumulation in particular has social and economic benefits. Simmel ([1907 Simmel ([ ]1978 describes the deference and privileges accorded a person believed to possess great sums of money as an 'unearned increment of wealth'. Yet through rhetorics and practices of social exclusion predicated on moral boundary drawing money practices can be used to disempower. Such uses of monies and money practices are the other side of the coin, as Hart (1986) suggests to images of money as freedom.
Ordinary understandings of moral order that are related to monies and money practices help explain and justify unequal distributions of wealth -as in the example of strivers and skivers discourse -which are already understood as moral and social problems in economic sociology and anthropology. 
Money Practices and Moral Orders
Creativity as virtue and self-fulfillment are central to many residents' understanding of SL (Boellstorff 2008:31) , and were linked with boundary work ordering people according to their moral status using money practices. Many respondents linked the virtues of creativity and labour as self-fulfillment with saving and earning Linden dollars. This perspective combines modern Western rational capitalism (Weber [1930] 2001:27-28) with creationist capitalism (Boellstorff 2008:206) , a moral order based on the virtues of work, frugality and creativity. This polity of 'virtuous' users contribute to SL's economy by saving virtual money, creating new commodities, and investing in entrepreneurship, unlike an imagined group of ostensibly less worthy residents who purchase Linden dollars with everyday monies and only consume. In this view earning and saving are better than conversion, but buying Linden dollars is a multivalent practice. Others respondents position conversion as neutral or even as a moral duty. For such interviewees, spending virtual money becomes a virtuous practice, a kind of basic civic participation. Distinctions between money practices define which values and activities constitute a 'good' Second Life, and order people along multiple moral spectra. The ease with which respondents transition between classifying virtual money practices and categorising people indicates moral boundary drawing in action. Virtual money practices and the moral status of people are mutually constituting.
Vivian Tei owns an SL haberdashery and clothing shop. Vivian prizes virtual craft skills, imagination and entrepreneurship; she describes her leisure-labour as 'a creative, fulfilling project'. For her, creativity is central to SL, and money earned through virtual work is a special reward. I spoke with Vivian while she was redecorating her newly expanded boutique.
Vivian: all of my money comes from my item sales. I buy very little and have a high quality standard, so I end up saving up a lot, which is good because it gives me money for more land later on. Vivan emphasises that her money flows from productive labour and innovative designs. This is the essence of creationist capitalism, 'in which labour is understood in terms of creativity, so that production is understood to be creation' (Boellstorff 2008:206 choice. Few objects meet her craftsmanship standards, so she refrains from spending. Savings must be used responsibly for business expansion; Vivian's first profits paid for an SL class on making interactive, customisable clothes. In this view, saving and reinvesting are not just money practices, they are virtuous acts. Vivian's beliefs echo the spirit of capitalism Weber ([1930 Weber ([ ]2001 
identifies in Benjamin
Franklin's writings. An entrepreneur has a moral duty 'toward the increase of his capital, which is assumed as an end in itself' (Weber [1930] 2001:16).
Vivian identified earning, saving, reinvestment as associated with virtues of frugality, enlarging capital and creation. She then drew moral boundaries between creators and residents who purchase Linden dollars.
Vivian: As for people using their real world assets, most people who start a business already do, be it $50 to cover buying the shop land or putting in some extra for front page listings on SL. Even if they put a large amount of money into it, it won't buy them skill or creativity, though they could hire people. However, there will still be many more talented people . . . and people who are not participating appropriately because they are not spending money. In this view, expenditure and recirculation of money are virtuous practices rather than creative labour or savings. This is an ethic of expenditure in which those who spend are 'participating' and those who do not are failing in a moral duty to recirculate money. Julie blends aspects of Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006:178-179, 195-198) world of public opinion and market world, with her emphasis on beauty and appearance on the one hand, and being a desiring subject, and spending money on the other. Julie does not fits into either category, and a mixture of the two fails to do justice to her moral schema or the conceptual work of Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 Hanna Gimble produces scripted objects, clothes and accessories for Furries, people who 'identify with, and may wish to assume, characteristics of nonhuman animals ' (Gerbasi et al., 2008:198) . Furry residents have their own well-established subcultures in SL (Boellstorff 2008:185; Bakioglu 2009 Hanna: it's sad, but they should stop being here. SL is special, we need everybody to contribute. just find some other place to go. Spending money signals desired content, which changes the unfolding creation of SL. Virtual money practices blend participation and creation in a dialectical process. For Hanna, conversion and spending are tied to maintaining virtual communities, and those who are not spending are not participating properly. Social ties are not sufficient measures of group membership; residents must also provide economic support by recirculating Linden dollars, producing or selling virtual commodities. Hanna too is a creationist capitalist (Boellstorff 2008:206) . This emphasis on spending as an ethical requirement is influenced by Hanna's everyday life in SL, which revolves around a Furry role-playing group that owns several large plots of virtual land. Group members contribute small sums to meet Linden Lab's monthly service charges. Hanna's contributions come from money she earns through consignment sales and her own purchases of Linden dollars. Like PD, Hanna also thinks residents who are not 'invest[ing]' economically should depart. Instead of beginning by drawing a firm moral boundary between those who are 'hurting SL' and those whose efforts improve the virtual world, she first makes a plea for improved behaviour. Her stress on contributions, and the need for residents to 'work together', suggests that participation should be contingent upon appropriate economic comportment. In this view, like that of PD, virtual existence and community participation are privileges that must be earned and maintained by bringing money into SL and recirculating it. Hanna's words for ostensibly non-contributing residents are less violent than PD's, but the underlying logic remains the same: economic non-participation is a moral failure justifying social exclusion.
Shop owners who purchase
IntLibber Brautigan was a virtual financier, entrepreneur and outspoken critic of Linden Lab; he is no longer an SL resident. In two interviews, IntLibber expressed concerns that economically virtuous (and industrious) users whose money practices build SL's economy, were being deprived of their deserved rewards, such as esteem, recognition and capital investment from business communities in the actual world. Like Vivian, IntLibber's moral ordering blend of Weber's ([1930] Metanomics, 2007b:26-27) For IntLibber, reduction of the Linden dollar to a product adds insult to injury. Linden Lab's policies and public statements devalue his virtual money practices and those of other SL entrepreneurs, preventing recognition for their business achievements. In an interview at the Ancapistan Capital Exchange (ACE), a virtual stock exchange he founded in SL, IntLibber elaborated on this theme. purchase even ostensibly non-convertible virtual monies. Except by proxy through racist categorisations (Nakamura 2009 ), research on RMT has not explored moralities, instead focusing on economic models (Heek 2009; Castronova 2006 i Emphasis in original. ii Residents use SL profiles to assess others' virtual social positions and identities (Beollstorff 2008:184) . Profile-stalking, or checking the profiles of people nearby or owners of virtual objects and businesses is normative, especially amongst entrepreneurs. Newer residents are also identifiable by their embodiment(s) and how they interact with others (Martey and Consalvo 2011:173) iii Business owners previously offered money and prizes for campers to boost traffic to their virtual land, which increased their visibility in the Second Life search engine. This practice is no longer permitted. iv Transhumanism is a deeply problematic movement whose Orientalised, racist and often sexist tropes are beyond the scope of this article, but it would be remiss not to acknowledge them. v The intriguing possibility of a tyrannical economic Singularity, resembling HAL-9000 from 2001: A Space Odyssey rather than the popular (mis)interpretation of Adam Smith's benevolent invisible hand, was not considered by IntLibber or other interviewees with similar views.
